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RESUMEN: El artículo aborda las formas de los estados tradicionales en el contexto de su origen 
histórico y evolución, confirmándose que en el orden legal tradicional, la propiedad de la tierra 
genera poder político distribuido entre varios sujetos, uno de los cuales representa a la comunidad y 
el otro, el estado mismo. Los autores muestran que este último no ha sido cubierto adecuadamente 
en la historia de la política. Se confirma, que en la era de los estados tradicionales, la diarquía era 
una forma típica de organización estatal, cuya esencia era la división de las prerrogativas del poder 
entre el gobernante supremo, que concentraba las funciones sacerdotales y el "vice-rey", ejerciendo 
todo el poder militar y administrativo. 
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ABSTRACT: The article addresses the forms of traditional states in the context of their historical 
origin and evolution, confirming that in the traditional legal order, land ownership generates 
political power distributed among several subjects, one of which represents the community and the 
other, the state itself. The authors show that the latter has not been adequately covered in the history 
of politics. It is confirmed, that in the era of traditional states, diarrhea was a typical form of state 
organization, whose essence was the division of the prerogatives of power between the supreme 
ruler, which concentrated the priestly functions and the "vice-king", exercising all military and 
administrative power. 
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INTRODUCTION.  
The form of the state is a set of political and legal characteristics of the latter, arising from its 
nature, essence, and content [The general theory of state and law. 2007; Lyubashits V.Ia., 2015; 
Elizarov M.V. 2009].  
If the functions and structure of the state, including the traditional state, reflect the essential 
characteristics of the latter, arising from its social purpose, role, and place occupied by the state in 
society, the form of the state, being determined by its essence, is also associated with the legal 
features of the organization of power. In other words, guided by the above interpretation of the 
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categories of nature and essence of the state, it can be concluded that the form (unlike structure and 
functioning) is determined precisely by the legal nature of statehood and is associated primarily 
with the legal order existing in society, which predetermines its historical variability, on the one 
hand, and diversity of forms, on the other hand, even in the states occupying the same stage of 
evolution [Paprygin E.S. 2009;Chirkin V.E. 2001]. 
The above explains the well-known internal inconsistency of the category of the form of the state, 
repeatedly noted in the literature [Valentin Ya. Lyubashits, Nikolay V. Razuvaev, Alexey Yu. 
Mamychev, Andrey Yu. Mordovtsev, Magomedov R.M. 2018, p. 135-138]. On the one hand, the 
form of the state as an aggregate of formal legal characteristics enshrined in the constitution or 
other legal acts does not always adequately correspond to the real organization of power in the state. 
On the other hand, the form of the state is highly significant for legal science, which, as we see, 
pays much attention to the typology of the state, built on the basis of its legal properties. At the 
same time, it is obvious that when considering a form of a state (and building typologies based on 
it), a number of methodological difficulties arise, the most important of which is associated with the 
lack of a single generally accepted definition of this category.  
Review of theoretical and methodological approaches and research positions.  
The literature, as a rule, either provides no detailed definitions of the form of the state, or these 
definitions are somehow reduced to listing its main elements, the number of which also lacks 
complete clarity (most often there are three elements - the form of government, the form of state 
structure, and the political regime).  
L.I. Spiridonov, in particular, is guided by this cumulative definition [Spiridonov L.I. 2001, p. 49]. 
A similar definition is given by V.S. Nersesiants, who, however, makes, in our opinion, a very 
significant addition that the form of the state represents a comprehensive characteristic of the rule of 
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law [Nersesiants V.S. 2006, p. 245]. Finally, some authors generally strive to avoid detailed 
definitions, in particular, A.V. Poliakov [2004, p. 555]. 
All the definitions available in the literature have a major drawback, namely, there is a clear 
tendency to confound formal and substantive (primarily structural) aspects of the state. In fact, if the 
form of a state is understood to mean its organization, or at least the organization of power, then, 
accordingly, any difference between the form and structure is lost. Of course, there is no doubt that 
the form of any phenomenon is always meaningful. Structure as an orderly interrelation of parts, 
elements of the whole, has a decisive influence on the form and, in turn, is determined by the 
characteristics of the latter [Kulkov M.O. 2005, p. 124-128]. However, scientific analysis suggests 
the need to distinguish between these interrelated but still relatively independent components of the 
studied phenomenon. 
Often, the distinction between form and content is so difficult to draw that there is a temptation to 
differentiate the formal component itself, pointing out, along with the “external form”, the “internal 
form”, which is, in a broad sense, a ratio of form and content. Based on this approach, it is logical to 
assume that the internal form of the state is precisely its structure, while the legal characteristics 
will be the external form. However, it seems that such a terminological clarification does not solve 
all the problems, when considering the form of the state in general, as well as the forms of 
individual (especially traditional) states, in particular. This circumstance was emphasized by some 
lawyers ; it was not by chance that at the beginning of the last century L. Gumplovich made critical 
remarks about the theories of state forms existing at that time, regarding this concept as “shaky and 
unidentified as the definition of the concept of state” [Gumplovich L. 1910, p. 221]. 
The need to take into account the historical dynamics of state forms when building their 
evolutionary typology shall be considered much more significant obstacle to the study of the 
outlined problem. This is explained by the interrelation of the type and form of the state, noted by 
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O.E. Nepomnin, who, using a specific example of the evolution of Chinese statehood in the first 
half of the XX century, suggested to identify four main characteristics of any state: gender, type, 
kind, and form. In this case, the generic indicator of the state is, according to the researcher, its 
formation characteristic, and the stage characteristic [O.E. Nepomnin. 1993, p. 334-361]. Referring 
to the example considered in this article, the generic feature of the Chinese state at the beginning of 
the XX century was feudal despotism, and the typological characteristic was absolutism.  
To be fair, we should note, however, that the issue of typology and types of state, including its 
terminology, is totally unclear, apparently due to the fact that the historical-materialistic approach 
had too great impact thereon. In particular, O.E. Nepomnin considers absolutism, Bonapartism, and 
bourgeois democracy as “full-fledged” types of state [O.E. Nepomnin. 1993, 345]. “Bonapartism” 
meanwhile can hardly be considered a type of state. As is known, K. Marx considered it only a kind 
of political regime [Marx K., p. 334-361], caused by the specific historical situation of the 
bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1848, which led to the establishment of the regime of personal 
power of Napoleon III, which is fully shared by modern authors [Smirnov A.Iu. 2003; Volkov A.K. 
2006]. Therefore, the absence of “Bonapartism” in China at the beginning of the XX century 
(except for Yuan Shikai’s short-term rule) indicates the inapplicability of such terms to the 
typological characteristic of statehood.  
At the same time, the ideas expressed by the author, in our opinion, shed light on the relationship 
between the type and form of the state. Being one of the aspects of the state, forms have their own 
dynamics, the laws of which are determined by the general pattern of evolution of this type of state. 
At the same time, the specificity of the corresponding forms is due to the typological features of the 
state. Moreover, the very forms of the state, as well as their elements used to distinguish and 
describe in legal literature, are the ideal types with all their intrinsic characteristics [Davydov Iu.N. 
2001; Schutz A. 2004].  
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This results in another extremely important conclusion, namely, the forms of the state are historical 
variable. In particular, each type corresponds to its own, inherent forms that have their own so-
called content. Considering the above, the desire of many lawyers to single out the same elements 
of the state form for all historical periods seems unreasonable. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the form of the traditional state, according to the historical specifics of the latter, will be the same 
form of government, which, in turn, is determined by the land ownership. Indeed, if a sign of 
territorial organization is irrelevant for a traditional state, then, it is hardly advisable to single out 
within the framework of the form of a traditional state such an element as a form of state-territorial 
structure. As for the political regime, when it comes to traditional states, the problem of the political 
regime becomes insoluble from a scientific point of view and causes many different judgments. 
Particularly typical in this respect are the assessments given by historians to the political regime of 
the Roman Empire, especially in its first centuries, when there was a noticeable discrepancy 
between the officially declared republican form of government (see, for example, CIL, VI, 1527; 
31670, etc.) and the de facto regime of the sole authority of Augustus and his successors [Mashkin 
N.A. 1949]. Noting this circumstance, the remarkable Soviet historian S.L. Utchenko emphasized 
the need to study it on the basis of the socio-political essence, rather than of the formal legal 
characteristics of this phenomenon [Utchenko S.L. 1998, p. 286]. Meanwhile, it turned out very 
often that the characteristics of the political regime of the empire somehow paid tribute to the 
modernizing tendencies since they used terminology that applies only to modern states.  
Thus, according to S.L. Utchenko, the main regularity of the evolution of the Roman state was “the 
transition from the forms of communal polis democracy to the totalitarian and leveling (sic! 
Allocated by us - author) regime of the empire” [Utchenko S.L. 1998, 308]. With such an approach, 
the Roman Empire turned out to be a direct predecessor and prototype of the totalitarian, fascist and 
communist regimes of the XX century. By the way, some of the leaders of such regimes (for 
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example, Italian dictator B. Mussolini) were not averse to occasionally proclaiming themselves the 
heirs of Roman August [Nemirovskii A.I. 2007, p. 880-881]. In addition, the very opposition of the 
democratic republic and the totalitarian empire also causes great doubts. In fact, whether the Roman 
republic is really “democratic” even in the last century of its existence. In our opinion, with all its 
other virtues, in terms of democracy, it lagged behind not only modern states, but even the most 
developed ancient democracies, first of all, Athenian. 
On the other hand, if we understand the “sociopolitical essence” as social base the state power rests 
on, then inevitably we will have to face a paradoxical, at first glance, situation when, with the 
transition from republic to monarchy, this base is both not limited, and, on the contrary, is 
expanding, since, unlike the republic, which relied on a narrow circle of indigenous citizens 
(Quirites) and those residents of the provinces who for special services received the rights of 
citizenship as an exception [Radzig S.I. 1959, p. 9-54], the empire (under Augustus) sought to rely 
on a wide layer of small provincial owners (mainly citizens) who did not possess the rights of 
citizenship [Marinovich L.P., Koshelenko G.P. 1994]. It is not surprising that already under the first 
Roman emperors, an active process of granting citizenship to provincial residents began. In 
particular, Claudius introduces representatives of the native nobility of Gaul and Spain to the 
Senate. The apogee of this process becomes the 212 Edict of Caracalla, which granted Roman 
citizenship rights to the entire free population of the empire [Elnitskii L.A. 1980, p. 162-171]. In 
this case, there is a temptation to present the political regime of the Roman Empire as almost a 
democracy (in any case, to declare it very close to that in its essential features). One of the first 
attempts of this kind was made in “History of Rome” by T. Mommsen [Mommsen T. 1997, p. 412], 
whose views find their supporters in modern historiography (in particular, L.S. Vasiliev [2007] 
expresses a similar point of view). 
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The truth seems to lie in a slightly different plane. In fact, as far as the political regimes inherent in 
traditional states are irrelevant to characterize modern states, so are the political regimes of modern 
times not applied to states of the traditional type. Moreover, in our opinion, there is every reason to 
doubt that the form of a traditional state includes the political regime as one of the elements. It is 
not by chance that ancient authors, beginning with Plato and Aristotle, considered democracy as 
one of the varieties of government.  
Thus, according to the statement of Aristotle (Arist. Pol. V, 1; 1279a), “The state structure means 
the same as the state administration, the latter is personified by the supreme power in the state, and 
the supreme power is certainly in the hands of either one, or few, or majority” [Aristotle. 1983, p. 
457]. As you know, Aristotle calls the first form of government a monarchy, the second - the 
aristocracy, the third - polity, relating tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy (considered by him as 
"deviations") thereto. Other political thinkers of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern 
period, from Polybius to Kant, shared these ideas (and similar terminology) [Polybius. 2004; 
Cicero. 1999; N. Machiavelli. 1997; Spinoza B. 1998; Locke J. 1988; Montesquieu Sh.L., 1955; 
Rousseau. J.J. 1969; Kant I. 1994]. It would be a great mistake to see this as the result of the 
underdevelopment of ideas about the political regime. In fact, here we are dealing with the merging 
of the form of the state and the form of government, extremely characteristic for the traditional state 
(and due to the peculiarities of the legal nature, essence, and content of the latter), entailing the 
almost complete identification of these categories, which G.V. Hegel insightfully noted [Hegel 
G.V.F. 1990, p. 311-312]. 
In our opinion, it would not be a great exaggeration to assert - given all the above - that the form of 
government in a traditional state was predetermined by the form of land ownership dominant in a 
particular society at the stage of its historical evolution. At the same time, according to I.M. 
Diakonov, already at the stage of early antiquity, there were at least three ways of development of 
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society characterized by different correlation of state (palace-temple) and private-communal land 
ownership [History of the Ancient World. 1982., p. 18-40]. The first way, the civilizations of 
Ancient Mesopotamia, for example, followed, is characterized by the coexistence of the public and 
private-communal sectors as relatively independent and independent of each other, with the first 
one predominating.  
The societies of ancient Egypt, China, and some other regions of the world followed the second 
way of development. A distinctive feature of this way was the gradual absorption of the private-
communal sector by the state, which can be especially clearly seen in the example of Ancient Egypt 
[Weber M. 2001, p. 171-202]. Finally, the third way of development arising at the beginning of the 
first millennium BC was characterized by the absolute primacy of communal-private ownership of 
land, which is almost completely absorbed state ownership. This way of development was the one 
the ancient societies of the Mediterranean chose. 
Of course, these three “general” ways of development of society and the state of antiquity cannot 
and should not overshadow the real diversity of the relationship between state, communal, and 
private ownership (including land ownership). Many historians have suffered from underestimating 
this diversity, which took place both in the West and in the East, from Herodot to our 
contemporaries, inclined, in particular, to regard all Eastern states as “despotism”. In this case, 
despotism was most often understood as a rigidly centralized state with the absolute and unlimited 
power of the monarch, a developed bureaucratic apparatus, etc. However, as O.A. Zhidkov and 
N.A. Krasheninnikov rightly point out, not all ancient Eastern monarchies can be considered 
despotic [History of state and law of foreign countries. 1998, p. 14-15]. Given the above, already 
the ancient Eastern state had various specific monarchical forms of government. The forms of the 
traditional state (both in the East and in the West) in the Middle Ages and at the turn of the New 
Age are characterized by even greater diversity.  
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Nevertheless, we may definitely assert that with the advent of the above-mentioned three ways of 
development, the prerequisites for identifying the main forms of the traditional state are also 
emerging. Of course, the dynamics of these forms was determined not only by the ratio of private-
communal and state ownership of land but also by the whole set of conditions (cultural, 
sociopolitical, etc.) that influenced the emergence and evolution of traditional statehood; however, 
land ownership was, in our opinion, the main and direct factor. In those societies, where the public 
sector was dominant, having absorbed the communal-private, the state was monarchical with a 
pronounced tendency towards its despotic variety. On the contrary, the republican form of 
government was typical in societies with dominant private and communal ownership, which 
included state land ownership. 
Speaking of the dominant position of certain forms of land ownership, one should certainly not 
forget that this right did not remain unchanged in all traditional societies. Over time, it evolved, 
which was manifested in a change in the ratio of various forms of this law (state, temple, 
communal, private) and the emergence of new forms. In particular, even in the East, where, as we 
have seen, the right of state and communal property was initially unconditionally dominant, the 
right of private property appears simultaneously, which arose in antiquity and strengthened in the 
Middle Ages, which, of course, could not but affected the dynamics of the forms of the eastern 
state.  On the other hand, in traditional Western societies, where the value of the right to private 
property was quite large from the very beginning, the supreme owner of the land was the state, 
which was first the civil community (polis), and then the Hellenistic, Roman, and Medieval 
monarchies. 
Changes in the forms of the traditional state. 
These circumstances make it possible, without a detailed analysis, to outline in general terms the 
dynamics of the forms of the traditional state in the East and the West, respectively. Thus, the main 
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types of traditional eastern states are nome; republic; monarchy (which, in turn, can be divided into 
patriarchal, despotic, and theocratic); and empire. The main types of a traditional western state, in 
turn, were: polis; medieval republics (oligarchic and democratic); monarchies, which were divided 
into patriarchal, seignorial, class, and absolute; empires which, in turn, are divided into centralized 
and decentralized. Of course, it would be a mistake to consider these forms successively replacing 
each other. For each specific traditional society, its own dynamics of state forms were 
characteristic, determined by the level of development of the respective society, as well as other 
factors. Nevertheless, there is, in our opinion, sufficient reason to believe that the change in the 
forms of the state in different epochs is subject to well-known laws, determined by trends in the 
development of the rule of law.  
The most difficult thing was in societies where communal-private and state ownership of land was 
in greater or less balance. In the traditional law and order, land ownership gives rise to political 
power, and, therefore, in such a situation, the distribution of power among several carriers was 
unavoidable, one of which represented the community, and the other - directly the state.  
We will call this form of government diarchy, distinguishing it from both monarchical and 
republican forms. It seems that diarchy as a form of government of a traditional state did not receive 
adequate coverage in the historical and legal literature; meanwhile, it was no less typical than a 
monarchy or a republic. 
The essence of diarchy as the form of government was the division of power prerogatives between 
the supreme ruler, who concentrated priestly (and in some cases judicial) functions, and the “vice-
king”, exercising the full military and administrative power. At the same time, the supremacy of the 
first was purely nominal, so, being bound by customs and ceremonies, he could not independently 
exercise his powers. As the research by H. Classen showed, the central institution in all early states 
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was the institution of the sacred king, mediating between subjects and deities [Claessen H. Y. M. 
1978; Kradin N.N. 1995].  
The ruler in his capacity was considered as a bearer of various kinds of goods, ensuring, in 
particular, the fertility of the land and the well-being of the community. Such, if we may say so, 
primary diarchy is an exceptionally characteristic and widespread form of the early state, not yet 
fully liberated from the remnants of the primitive system, even suggesting that the path from the 
pre-state polities to the traditional state lies through diarchy. 
This was extremely depicted in ancient Indian monuments (for example, in Mahabharata and in 
Vishnu Smriti), where the king is regarded as the bearer of rain, which ensures the fertility of the 
earth [Vasilkov Ia.V. The 1979; Romanov V.N. 1978; Romanov V.N. 1991]. The conceptual 
parallel to the above is given by the ideas of the ancient Greeks of the Homeric epoch, which were 
reflected, in particular, in the Odyssey (see: Od., XIX, 111-114), where the king is also regarded as 
the bearer of abundance.  
As M. Nilsson showed, these ideas date back to the Mycenaean era [Nilsson M. 1933, p. 220]. 
Other ancient peoples have similar beliefs [Eliade M. 1995, p. 48]. In its extreme terms, this faith 
endowed the supreme ruler with world-building functions, as was the case in ancient China, where 
the emperor was considered as a universal figure [Bokshchanin A.A. 1993, p. 273-274].  
As it is well known, such ideas had a powerful impact on the further development of Chinese 
statehood, determining its specific (even for traditional states of the Ancient East) character, 
however, their initial and main function was nevertheless the legitimation of the emperor's power. 
Belief in the sacral, world-building qualities of the ruler had its reverse side. Along with the spread 
of such ideas, many cultures become convinced that the ruler as a bearer of divine grace (charisma) 
has no right to engage in earthly affairs, in particular, to shed blood, since this may adversely affect 
its charisma and thereby deprive the ability to provide fertility. This finally leads to a significant 
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restriction of the real power of the ruler holding only priestly and possibly judicial functions, while 
other powers - first of all, military and administrative - are transferred to his deputy [Razuvaev N.V. 
2011, p. 9-14]. 
The rich ethnographic and historical material testifies to the exceptional antiquity of the institute of 
diarchy, which originates in pre-state societies being on the verge of the chiefdom, and exists in 
various manifestations up to the end of the Middle Ages. Thus, in the North Indian tribes - Naga, 
along with the leaders-priests, whose power was nominal, there were military leaders who managed 
the affairs of the tribe [Maretina S.A. 1967; Maretina S.A. 1980], although the authority of the first 
greatly exceeded the authority of the second. In the early state society of Benin in the XI-XIX 
centuries, many communities had two leaders at the same time — odiovere who was a sacred 
figure, and onogie who in turn obeyed the supreme ruler of the country (oba), whose power, 
however, was nominal [Bondarenko D.M. 1996;Bradbary R. E. 1951; Egharevba Y. U. 1949;Idem. 
A 1960; Sidahome Y. E. 1964]. 
Power in the nom city-states of Sumer, already in the Early State period (2750-2315 BC), was 
divided between the ruler-priest (en, ensi) and the military ruler (lugal). The latter was elected by 
the people's assembly initially for the duration of the war, but later his power became lifelong and 
hereditary [Poliakova G.F. 1983, p. 168-170]. A similar situation had developed in the states that 
existed in Greece and on the islands of the Aegean Sea in the II millennium BC. The supreme 
power there belonged to Wanaka (later Greek ά ) [Chedwick Y. 1976, p. 62-64]. Proceeding 
therefrom, a similar title was applied to the supreme deity of the pantheon [Lindgren M. 1973, p. 
151]; it can be assumed that Wanaka was (as well as the ENSI in Ancient Mesopotamia) the high 
priest of the corresponding deity. In general, we do not have information on the extent of power the 
Wanaka had, however, judging by the sources that remained, the real powers were concentrated in 
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the hands of the military leader - lavaget [Effentere H. 1967; Lejeune M. 1965; Buzeskul V.P. 
2003]. 
A similar division of powers remained in the archaic polis states of Greece, particularly in Athens at 
their early stage. As is known, one of the least clarified episodes is the abolition of the monarchical 
form of government and the transfer of power to the board of archons. Already, the ancient authors 
lacked consensus regarding both the causes and the very date of the liquidation of the monarchy. 
The prevailing point of view was and still is that according to which, even in the Homeric epoch 
(XI-IX centuries BC), "the king ... combined the duties of a military leader, ruler, judge, and priest" 
[Arist. Ath. Pol., 1938, p. 35]. However, over time, most likely in the middle of the VIII century, 
these powers were divided between three elected officials - basileus, polemarch, and eponym 
(whom Aristotle called archon).  
Aristotle says that “the position of basileus ranked first and was inherited from fathers. The second 
was the post of the polemarch, in view of the fact that some of the tsars turned out to be weak in 
military affairs... The last was the post of archon” [Egorov A.B. 2006, p. 14]. 
It follows from the above that the basileus performed priestly functions, the polemarch - the 
military, and the archont-eponym - administrative. However, the assumption that the hypothetically 
reconstructed period of the sole monarchy in Athens is only a tribute to tradition has the color of 
reason. In reality, the “primordial” (inherited from the Mycenaean era) form of government in 
Athens already in Homer's epoch was precisely a diarchy, characterized by the distribution of 
powers between the priest-ruler (basileus) and the warlord-ruler.  
Gradually, with the development of Athenian statehood, there was a further fragmentation of 
powers and the emergence of new officials, which helped prepare the prerequisites for the transition 
to a democratic republican system in the VI—V centuries BC. 
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The dynamics of royal power in Early Rome (VIII-VI centuries BC) was characterized by 
pronounced originality, and its immediate result was the abolition of the monarchy as a result of the 
“aristocratic revolution” of 506 BC, which marked a more abrupt break with a prior tradition than in 
Athens. At the same time, as in other early-state formations of the ancient world, power in tsarist 
Rome was divided between three institutions: the national assembly, which was the general 
gathering of all full-fledged citizens, the senate, originally the council of tribal (and then 
communal) elders, and the king [Kofanov L.L. 2001, p. 38].  
It should be noted that, on the one hand, the power of the kings received sufficiently comprehensive 
coverage both in the writings of ancient historians (primarily Titus Libya and Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus) and in modern studies. On the other hand, the scope of royal power, as well as the 
functions performed by the king, remain unexplained. All historians somehow believe that the king 
(rex) in Rome was primarily a military leader who possessed unlimited power during the period of 
military operations. In peacetime, the king had the prerogatives to submit draft laws for 
consideration by the public gathering [Gjerstad E. 1972, p. 14-24], as well as administrative and 
judicial powers. In addition, rex was the bearer of sacral power and performed priestly functions 
[Kofanov L.L. 2008, p. 143-145].  
It seems that the question of the place of royal power in the system of political institutions of early 
Rome is directly related to another extremely important problem of the establishment of royal 
power as such. In this regard, of considerable interest is the hypothesis that the power of the rex in 
Rome initially was purely sacral, and its strengthening occurs as military and judicial-administrative 
functions are added to the sacral functions of the king-priest, which becomes possible along with 
overcoming the dualism of royal power (diarchy). Evidence of diarchy in tsarist Rome in its most 
ancient period is the augural rank of the kings (Cic. Div., I, 89) [Wissowa G. 1894; Roux J.-P. 
1959].  
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An exceptionally important fact is that the augurs did not have the right to make sacrifices 
associated with the shedding of blood. All their rites were bloodless. In particular, this applies to the 
sacrifices to the god Termin, performed by augurs during the survey of fields and the allocation of 
land. Thus, the post of the augur was a kind of reminder of those times when the king, as the sacred 
ruler of the community, had no right to shed blood and had to observe ritual purity in all cases. It 
was not by chance that the sacrificial congregation, the pontiffs, whose head (pontifex maximus) 
played the same role in the ritual sphere that the “younger ruler” played in the political and 
administrative sphere, and, perhaps, was the head of this board. 
Medieval state formations, both earlier and more mature, provide numerous examples of diarchy. In 
particular, we can observe this form of government in the Khazar Kaganate, headed by kagan, 
endowed with divine, world-building qualities. Not only the well-being of his subordinates (kuts) 
but also the maintenance of cosmic order directly depended on the actions of kagan [Idem. La 
religion des Turc et des Mongols,1984; Paskov S.S. 1987].  
Accordingly, the most important requirement for kagan was the preservation of the purity 
prescribed by the ritual; that is why, the figure of his “deputy” (referred to as yabgu-kagan, kagan-
beg or shad) was constantly present next to kagan. One cannot completely exclude the fact that the 
diarchy was formed among the nomadic peoples of Central Asia (Khazars, Turks, Oguzes) under 
the direct influence of Chinese examples. Indeed, in China, as a result of the development of similar 
ideas about the appointment of imperial power (as mentioned above), there is a tendency to 
strengthen the role of the chancellor (chengxiang) in the imperial palace.  
However, already in the II century BC, emperors from the Han dynasty and especially vigorous 
Wu-di (141–87 BC) nullified chenxiang’s influence on public affairs and court life, which led to the 
final choice of the vector of further development in favor of the dynastic monarchy. 
17 
The diarchy in medieval Japan was quite stable, and, starting from the IX century, several specific 
options were tested, the most viable of which, as is known, was shogunate, which began to mature 
at the end of the XI century and finally formed by the XVI century. However, other models also 
deserve attention, in particular, the establishment of the office of chancellor, who concentrated all 
power under the virtually powerless emperor (since 888, representatives of the Fujiwara house have 
occupied this post on a hereditary basis) [History of the East. 2002].  
In the XI century, with the spread of Buddhism in Japan, some emperors accepted monasticism and 
abdicated their throne, while retaining considerable influence in public affairs [Muller A. 2004, p. 
339]. It is noteworthy that one of these ex-emperors, Sirakawa, stated that “only the waters of the 
Kamegawa River, dices, and monks from the Mount Hiei” do not obey him [Muller A. 2004, p. 
340]. 
The post of the first minister (vizier) at the court of the Baghdad caliphs from the Abbasid dynasty 
was no less vivid and typical illustration of the diarchy. Formally, the caliph, as before, was the 
head of state, the absolute ruler, endowed with all the entire spiritual, secular, military, and judicial 
power. In fact, other persons (the vizier, the chief qadi, the head of the palace guard, etc.) begin to 
occupy this post instead of the caliph.  
A similar process of loss of real power by the caliph (while maintaining the status of the head of 
state) took place in the Cordoba caliphate during the rule of Hisham II al-Muayyad. Under his 
reign, the role of the first minister (hajib) increased exclusively, which position for many years was 
held by the famous Mohammed ibn Abu Amir al-Mansur, who hold the caliph as a captive rather 
than a ruler [Muller A. 2004, p. 706]. However, due to the time of troubles that soon followed and 
the subsequent collapse of the Cordoba caliphate under pressure of the Christian Reconquest, the 




In the traditional law and order, land ownership gives rise to political power, and, therefore, in such 
a situation, the distribution of power among several carriers was unavoidable, one of which 
represented the community, and the other - directly the state. We will call this form of government 
diarchy, distinguishing it from both monarchical and republican forms. It seems that diarchy as a 
form of government of a traditional state did not receive adequate coverage in the historical and 
legal literature; meanwhile, it was no less typical than a monarchy or a republic. 
The essence of diarchy as the form of government was the division of power prerogatives between 
the supreme ruler, who concentrated priestly (and in some cases judicial) functions, and the “vice-
king”, exercising the full military and administrative power. The diarchy, in this case, seems to have 
the same reason as in all the above, namely, the conviction of the sacral character of royal power. 
These, as well as many other examples of diarchies in the medieval states of the West and East, 
make it possible to talk about the existence of a secondary diarchy along with the primary one, 
which is a kind of political relapse of this form of government under unspecific social-historical 
conditions.  
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